Description
The paper will investigate how concerns over semiconductor production and global supply chains link into the broader technological dimension of the great power competition unfolding between the US and China and what this means for the contestation for influence within both the East Asian and global economic and security hierarchies. After decades of encouraging China’s integration with the global economy and the opening of its markets, the emergent narratives of ‘de-coupling’ and ‘de-risking’ relations with China in parallel with ‘friend-shoring’ among Western allies reflect a changing strategic landscape in which the once-pervasive optimism of increased interdependence is challenged. In its place, the threat of the weaponisation of interdependence in economic and technological networks now shapes the dynamics of great power competition. Yet China’s economic importance complicates the US’s attempts to impose its preferences among allies with respect to security domain issues. Conflicting preferences have emerged as some US-based businesses and various allies have argued against export controls and restrictions on Chinese firms due to the negative implications for their economic interests. This paper compares Western policy responses to the tech challenge from China and evaluates the implications for the US’s attempt to maintain primacy over China with support from allies.
