Description
This paper analyses the role of cyber statecraft in the competitive reshaping of international order, specifically the case of the UK seeking global leadership in the cyber domain. The centrality of the international dimensions of cybersecurity is reflected in the UK’s ambition, articulated in the Integrated Review and subsequent National Cyber Strategy, to be a ‘responsible, democratic cyber power’. These high-level strategic documents note that contesting the future of cyberspace dovetails with the UK’s broader foreign policy challenges and opportunities. This paper argues that the UK needs to embrace ‘cyber statecraft’ in order to meets its international cybersecurity objectives. We problematize the concept of cyber statecraft, by tracing its genealogy and contrasting it with the more traditional (and generic) concept of statecraft. We explore how the concept is embedded (but not necessarily rendered explicit) in UK cyber strategy, proposing that we understand cyber statecraft as a strategic approach for securing the national interest in and through cyberspace, using all levers of national power and marshalling the private sector and civil society. This demands breaking institutional siloes within government and building bridges with these non-state actors in a ‘whole-of-society’ effort.