Description
A common feature of security orders in countries that have experienced prolonged civil wars has been governments’ increasing reliance on semi- or irregular militias to operate as counterinsurgency, chiefly at the periphery. However, the ascent of such forces has been at the expense of the regular forces. Army officers, once a privileged elite, now witnessed a growing competition over resources from the side of militia commanders and their patrons in the periphery. In some countries, militia commanders have become key figures in politics and the economy (licit and illicit alike), thus replacing military officers. However, in others, the army has risen to the challenge, remobilising its sources and power to undermine the increasing power of the militias and their leaders on regaining its influence in the country’s politics.
Why have some armies been able to recuperate and retain their position amid the rise of militias from the periphery? Are the leading causes for the survival of the army’s institutional power like conflict, society, political economy and state? What tactics have the army officers used to regain or retain their influence? To answer these questions, the paper employs the case of Sudan. After years in which the Rapid Support Forces, a militia whose roots are in the Darfurian countryside, has become the dominant armed force in the country, the army, under the leadership of Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan, rose against the RSF, pushing the RSF outside of Khartoum. By so doing, the Sudanese army succeeded where other armies have failed. This paper aims to use Sudan’s case to probe the factors that enable the army to regain its position and face a threat from the militia, which carries important lessons for other cases in which militias have risen to prominence.
