Description
In 2014, the then Minister of Defense, Jean-Yves Le Drian claimed that the research and development of the new ASN4G - fourth-generation air-to-surface nuclear missile – had begun and declared: “Bold designs, using for example stealth or hypervelocity technologies, at the forefront of technological developments, will be explored”. Since January 2023, it is official that the ASN4G, scheduled to replace the ASMP-A by 2035, will be a hypersonic missile developed by MBDA. The choice to develop hypervelocity technologies has been justified, and its cost legitimised, using deterrence theory arguing that scramjet-powered hypersonic cruise missiles, like the ANS4G, make early warning and interception extremely challenging, if not impossible at this date. However, this realist approach has flaws such as the questionable advantages hypersonic missiles have on nuclear deterrence. Alternative explications highlight the quest for modernisation using normative theory based on prestige and international recognition. Despite some important contributions, this approach dismisses security and domestic factors and relies on research focusing on nuclear weapons acquisition and not specific technological changes as is the case in this project. Indeed, previous research excels in highlighting why states acquire and keep nuclear weapons, but limited research has been conducted to explain why and how governments modernize them. The aim of this research is to build on existing research on nuclear weapons acquisition. Additionally, it fills a gap by analysing the different factors that influence the implementation of hypersonic technologies in the future French nuclear air-to-ground missile focusing on deterrence, norms, and bureaucratic theories. This project features contemporary figures contributing to the field with its novelty and offering new empirics. Finally, it aspires to move the nuclear weapons field beyond the questions of acquisition, providing nuanced explanations for nuclear weapons modernisation.
