Description
The role emotions play in the analysis of intelligence has often been overlooked by the scholarly literature. Yet the emotions of both analysts and their adversaries have been a significant contributing factor in numerous intelligence ‘failures’ around the world. Using historical case studies such as the Yom Kippur War, the Vietnam War, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this paper creates a new exploration of the role emotions have played in the inability to accurately analyse intelligence. The selected case studies demonstrate that the emotions of analysts have often inhibited their abilities to estimate intelligence correctly, or that the emotions of their adversaries have been disregarded and difficult to judge, leading to a lack of strategic empathy and an inability to evaluate intentions. The paper subsequently seeks to provide policy proposals on how to overcome these issues. Increased Humint collection, hiring analysts with area-specific expertise, and cognitive training are some of the methods that agencies could adopt. Yet increased AI-driven analysis, praised for its dispassionate algorithmic scrutiny of adversaries’ actions, may be the key to circumventing the obstacles of emotions in the future of intelligence.
