Description
This project examines why American special operations troops, paramilitary officers, and intelligence analysts continued to work closely with controversial Afghan powerbrokers after evidence of human rights violations was uncovered. The decision to partner with disgraced warlords often strained relationships with close international allies, especially countries that shared similar values, cultures, and strategic goals with the United States.
Using recently declassified documents and interviews with intelligence officials, special operations personnel, diplomats, and military commanders, this paper will focus on three controversial warlords: Abdul Rashid Dostum, Matiullah Khan, and Gul Agha Sherzai. All three men enjoyed early support from American forces, but their critics became more vocal as evidence of corruption and human rights abuses emerged and they continued to pursue long-held political ambitions and economic opportunities at the expense of Afghan national and regional interests. Despite growing criticism, special operations troops and intelligence operatives remained enamored with Dostum, Khan, and Sherzai, all of whom processed limited English language skills, demonstrated a rudimentary understanding of western military culture, and regularly invited the Americans to lavish dinners at which the warlords made rousing pro-American statements. This manipulation often manifested itself when warlords identified Taliban commanders and sympathizers to their special operations partners, especially after major combat operations ended. Coalition forces needed little prompting to conduct raids or direct airstrikes against these individuals, and the Americans rarely attempted to confirm the accuracy of the targeting information by consulting other intelligence sources. Although some of the targets were enemy fighters, many appear to have been political, tribal, ethnic, or economic competitors of the trusted warlords.
