Description
Scholars agree that coercion is an essential element of success in mediation involving deliberate attacks against civilians. The puzzles have been about the roles, mechanisms, actors, and interpretation of success. This paper develops the atrocity mediation model to solve these puzzles. I argue that the solution centres on solving the agent-coercion problem in international affairs: conflict parties are legitimate, rational, voluntary agents who retain choice when considering the cost/benefit implications of the mediator’s peace proposals despite being coerced by more powerful players. So, mediators must embrace strategic coercion, involving creating ripeness using enticing peace offers and applying coercive measures to influence the reluctant parties’ choice. Strategic coercion must comprise sanction, judicial, and military mechanisms and perform the following roles: obtaining consent, breaking stalemate, or consensus-building. The purpose is to accelerate decision-making on resolving the proximate causes of violence that triggered atrocities. Strategic coercion campaigns are deliberate overt actions, and so any powerful actor can implement them. I build the atrocity model on coercion theory and mediation concepts, especially the enticing opportunity model of the ripeness theory. I illustrate the model’s explanatory importance by analysing the ‘most significant’ and ‘typical’ case of the African Union-led international mediation in Kenya.
