Description
The concept of blind spots has gained more systematic attention in political science and public administration as a potentially important cause of creeping or sudden disasters that could have been prevented with earlier recognition and action. In foreign and security policy the term or close variants have been occasionally used, but a lack of precise definition in relation to other concepts or tailored research designs to empirically study their main causes leaves a clear gap in the literature. So far, blind spots are mainly invoked as an analogy in passing or for explaining single cases without the aspiration to build theory applicable to other domains. The proposed paper aims to conceptualise and theorise the main causes of blind spots at a time when many organisations in charge of security have access to ever more data and sophisticated analytical methods, but have found themselves overwhelmed, struggle with prioritisation, and often face criticism for under-reaction to threats. Critical blind spots in foreign affairs are conceptualised as severe, enduring and largely unacknowledged limitations in the sensory or cognitive capacities of an international actor or groups of actors that render potentially grave problems invisible or misunderstood, and, therefore, unaddressed.
