Description
How might AI-enabled warfare effect human psychology during nuclear crises? This paper evokes Thomas Schelling’s theory of “threat that leaves something to chance” to consider how states can credibly signal resolve and compete under the shadow of a nuclear war. Schelling’s theory provides insight into how and why state actors may seek to manipulate risk to achieve competitive advantage in bargaining situations and how this contest of nerves, resolve, and credibility can lead states to stumble inadvertently into war. How might the dynamics of the age of AI affect Schelling’s theory? The paper explores the implications of Schelling’s insights on crisis stability between nuclear-armed rivals in the age of AI-enabling technology and contextualizes them within the broader information ecosystem. It engages with interdisciplinary human psychology, behavioral science, and anthropological studies, offering fresh perspectives and insights on the “AI-nuclear dilemma”—the intersection of technological change, strategic thinking, and nuclear risk. The paper concludes that the risks of nuclear-armed states leveraging Schelling’s “something to chance” in the digital era obviate any potential bargaining benefits in brinkmanship.
