Description
Why are some NATO nuclear hardware sharing initiatives successful while others fail? The issue of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries has generated renewed discussion following several modernization decisions and increased NATO-Russian tensions. Proponents of foreign nuclear deployments argue that the visible nature of the deployments reassures NATO allies. Skeptics contend that public opposition creates domestic political problems for host governments. This generates intra-alliance tension that outweighs any strategic reassurance benefits. I argue both positions are flawed. An initiative is likely to succeed when key members view it as advancing their strategic position but importantly this is not always the case. U.S. nuclear deployment initiatives fail to reassure when they portend to weaken a state’s deterrent. Leaders anticipate public opposition and so are able to manage domestic political concerns. I assess my claims with an examination of four major initiatives utilizing declassified documents and public opinion data dating to the 1950s. The results have implications for current NATO nuclear debates as well as the influence of public opinion on national security decision-making.
