Description
This paper explores the epistemological and ontological assumptions of the "hard" or “high” sciences in modern weapons development. To do so, it details the pursuit of acquiring "magic bullet" weapons and an associated "superweapon" peace in US doctrine and innovation, arguably culminating in the invention of the atomic bomb. This paper reveals the development of a "technoscientific rationality" to favour and legitimise such weapons, which correspondingly attempts to dismiss ethical, moral, or normative arguments against such weapons. Furthermore, “technoscientific rationality” may also impact who are considered "experts" to speak on nuclear issues and/or governance. For its methodology, this paper utilises an interpretivist qualitative analysis of US government policy documents, transcripts and public speeches, and formalised doctrine. Overall, this paper contributes a much-needed investigation into the sociology of science and war, and its under-represented relevance to nuclear weapons.
