Description
This study investigates the role of selective amnesia when a state updates its foreign policy preferences. While traditional approaches to selective amnesia within a state’s policymaking community suggest how the dismissal of failures leads to reckless policies (Philpott 2009; Krishna 2001), this article argues that the overemphasis of failures can have a similarly detrimental effect. Drawing upon the narrative that U.S. engagement with the People's Republic of China (1972–2017) has been a “failure” (Johnston 2019; Fingar 2021), this study identifies three ways in which such selective memory has shaped policy swings. Firstly, the exaggeration of past losses encourages a more confrontational posture in future bilateral disputes; secondly, the disparagement of past gains weakens efforts to stabilize existing ties and address shared challenges; and thirdly, the reconstruction of “means” as “ends” introduces new sources of friction in an already strained relationship. While policymakers often construct these narratives to justify foreign policy adjustments ex post, presenting historical policies as “failures” can lead to overconfident, risky decisions and missed opportunities for continued cooperation. In so doing, this article highlights the overlooked but significant role that historical narratives—both positive and negative—play in shaping the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy, not only toward China but also Russia, Israel, and beyond.
