Description
This paper examines the origins of America's strategic commitment to the Middle East. It traces the establishment of a robust overseas presence in the region to a series of decisions taken by the Carter and Reagan administrations designed to respond to an "arc of crisis". In doing so, however, it sheds new light on the surprising degree to which these efforts were shaped by domestic political concerns. The paper therefore makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of grand strategy. First, whereas existing literature emphasises variables at the international level, this paper highlights the role played by domestic political forces in mediating the impact of geopolitical changes on a state's regional posture. The impact of electoral constraints, lobby groups and congressional pressures is shown to be complex - at times accelerating the establishment of an overseas presence, at other times constraining the ability of officials to do so. Second, the paper draws on extensive original archival research and a series of elite interviews with senior administration officials to help us gain a fuller understanding of how the United States became so deeply enmeshed in the regional security architecture of the Middle East. In doing so, it also offers a series of salient lessons and analogies for the present moment, in which scholars and policymakers debate how best to "rightsize" the military footprint in that region while dialling up the commitment to other theatres in response to new and renewed geopolitical challenges from China and Russia.
