Description
This paper examines how security services, military institutions, and patron-client networks reinforce authoritarian regimes, using Syria’s Assad regime as a primary case study. Despite considerable internal and external pressures since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the Assad regime has shown remarkable resilience. This study explores how authoritarian mechanisms such as coercion, surveillance, and patronage distribution strengthen the regime’s control. Adopting a mixed-method approach, the research includes qualitative interviews with former intelligence agents and military personnel, quantitative surveys of the Syrian diaspora, and network analysis to investigate interactions within Syria’s power structures. By situating the Syrian context within broader theories of authoritarian resilience, this study aims to contribute to academic discourse on authoritarianism and regime stability. The research also holds significant policy implications, offering insights that could inform security sector reforms. As authoritarianism resurges globally and democracy faces strain worldwide, this study is particularly timely, enhancing our understanding of the strategic foundations that enable authoritarian regimes to endure.
