Description
Recent research on air pollution activism in Poland has documented evidence that despite the “green conservatism” bordering on “environmental nativism” (Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021) of the Law and Justice government (2015-2023), political elites reacted positively to air pollution activism.activism (Malby et al., 2024). This was explained in terms of the concurrence of (i) a particular (health) framing of air pollution, (ii) the devolution of power and responsibility for managing air quality to the regional government, (iii) the circulation of new information and data, and (iv) the emergence of new actors and activist strategies (Subašić, Birch, et al., 2024). Since the 2023 election of Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and the commitment of the Tusk government to restoring liberal democracy and returning to a ‘European’ and liberal path, we examine whether the pace of progressive environmental reform has increased, and the capacity of activists to influence political elites has been augmented (Malby et al., 2024). Focusing on climate activist campaigns, we interrogate a core assumption within the scholarship on green activism, namely that progressive environmental agendas are most likely to occur under green, alternative and liberal (GAL) governments, whilst traditional, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) governments are commonly associated with climate change scepticism (Lockwood 2018, Colvin and Jotzo, 2021). We also use the case of Poland during the PíS and PO governments to consider the extent to which environmental issues can still be said to exacerbate left-right polarization. We employ a qualitative approach combining results from a scoping focus group and a series of interviews conducted we plan to conduct in early 2025 across Poland.
