Description
This paper addresses a neglected topic of conditions under which great powers abandon or significantly modify their peaceful grand strategies for status reasons. It seeks to explain with the help of the case studies of Russia and China the strategic interaction between great powers and the pivotal role that domestic coalitions play in generating expectations of reciprocity and status recognition. Based on strategic interaction theory, two sets of arguments are proposed: one 'expectations of reciprocity' and the other 'expectations of opportunity.' Under the first category, leaders launch peaceful grand strategies with the expectation of reciprocity from their adversaries that recognize their status and position in the international system. When leaders do not receive expected positive reciprocity or status recognition from their adversaries they may abandon or substantially modify their peace commitments. Under the second category, strategies of peace are abandoned if great power states expect opportunity for expansion and status assertion and their opponents do not vigorously impede their progress. The violent conflict in Ukraine unleashed by Russia and the near abandonment of a strategy of peaceful rise by China are explored as case studies.
