Description
There is an emerging consensus that conspiracy theories can fuel extremism and undermine democratic institutions. That framing fits comfortably within well understood practices of state securitization, which have recently targeted conspiracy theories, misinformation and disinformation as threats to national security. Likewise, mainstream politicians and science experts have often dismissed conspiracy theorists through demeaning, moralistic and anti-populist language. While these issues have been examined in recent scholarship, less has been said about the extent to which conspiracy theories also position the security policies of the state as an existential threat.
We argue that security discourses and conspiracy discourses should not be understood in isolation. Instead, we show that these narratives are entangled in contending securitization processes. On the one hand, the securitisation of conspiracy theories by the state tends to harden beliefs and accelerate in-group dynamics amongst communities censured for their dangerous ideas. On the other hand, when state security policies are securitised in conspiracy theories, those policies lose traction not just with groups advancing such narratives, but also with wider publics, who become aware of resistance to them. We demonstrate this argument through the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, which triggered both securitization practices by central governments and forms of contestation through conspiracy theories. To support our argument, we provide illustrations from several Western European countries where these contending securitisation processes opened up space for resistance to what came to be seen by many as draconian policies. We suggest that the contending securitization processes identified here reflects a wider relationship between elite and popular securitisation, which has been under examined in the securitisation literature, despite its significant ramifications for how security policy is legitimised and contested.
