Description
Recent conflicts such as in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen close co-operation between foreign actors and local indigenous actors with the aim of building and maintaining security. When utilising local indigenous security forces there will inevitably come some challenges that the foreign actors must be aware of.
If the foreign actors are conducting themselves, and the operation in question, in accordance with Jus post Bellum then it means they are acting in a way that is defined by a certain moral framework and in accordance with restrictions that place limits on their actions. The indigenous forces that they are utilising however may not share those morals, they make take actions (both before and after involvement with the foreign actors) that challenge or break the moral framework understood by the foreign actors. In supporting or enabling these actions, the foreign actors face a moral compromise; if utilising the local indigenous forces is truly necessary for the provision of security then accepting their morally dubious practices may be required even if it goes against the morals of the foreign actors themselves. They must, in a sense, compromise on their morals for what seems like a worthy cause. The question is, how much compromise can be permitted and how might that compromise be regulated?
This paper will utilise the concept of Rotten Compromise in conjunction with the moral framework of Jus Post Bellum to explore the limits of acceptable moral compromise in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
