Description
When do states follow principled stances in international relations, and when do pragmatic interests guide them? I explore this question in the context of India’s response to US nuclear sanctions from the 1970s to the 2000s. I find that despite criticizing sanctions imposed by the US, India adapted to several US-backed international sanctions regimes aimed at checking nuclear proliferation by states. As sanctions became an important part of Washington’s policy toolkit after India’s first nuclear test in 1974, Indian leaders maintained that they had not and would never support unilateral sanctions against any state. However, this professed aversion did not align with their actual policy.
I examine three factors that might have influenced India’s frequent adaptation to US nonproliferation sanctions despite New Delhi’s avowed distaste for such measures. First, India’s nuclear pragmatism may have extended to its assessment of US nonproliferation sanctions, even as its experience as a sanctionee influenced its rhetorical stand. Second, given India’s history of initiating and supporting international efforts to check nuclear proliferation, this end may have taken precedence over India’s disdain towards sanctions as the means for achieving nonproliferation. Third, following India’s second round of nuclear tests in 1998, Washington’s eventual acknowledgement of India as a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology” may have impacted New Delhi’s stance on US nonproliferation sanctions against other states.
The paper delves into the three factors, relying on archival material at the Library of Parliament, public documents, and interviews with nuclear experts. Its findings are important for understanding how principles and pragmatism often coexist and operate simultaneously in policymakers' minds as they negotiate external relations.
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