Description
Although traditional nuclear deterrence frameworks conceptualize responses to nuclear warfare, these frameworks exclude conventional warfare that damages nuclear energy facilities. Warfare on nuclear energy poses a significant challenge to our understanding of deterrence, given its similarity to low-yield nuclear attacks in potential impact and the weakness of existing international norms preventing its use (Ackerman, 2016; Davis, 2023). This paper utilizes insights from the attacks on Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl during the War in Ukraine to explore the development of deterrents and norms. The paper proposes the existence of a new form of deterrence that transcends current frameworks of resilience, denial, and punishment: deterrence via short- and long-term environmental factors. Such “deterrence by environment” at nuclear energy facilities includes the immediate impact of warfare on nearby attacking forces as well as the prolonged radiation risk within contested territory. Such a deterrent may influence future decision-making by countries with nuclear energy programs, like the United Kingdom, to disincentivize attacks on their own facilities.
