Description
Russia’s military occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is the most recent emergence of the understudied phenomenon of state actors and their proxies engaging in intentional, nefarious acts against nuclear facilities. This paper seeks to explore why states engage in this strategy, despite the potential risks to life, the environment, and the potential for future escalation. Our theory, which we term ‘civil nuclear coercion’, argues that states employ this strategy to shape the actions of the target state and to influence them to align with the coercer state’s wider goals and priorities. Our theory is supported by a series of case studies that demonstrate the various tactics of coercion states and their proxies employ to achieve this end. Our findings raise serious questions about the future implications of civil nuclear coercion in a world of shifting norms and geopolitics. We also evaluate the current global landscape of international humanitarian law, global norms and governance, and industry guidance to propose how states, with this theory in mind, could make themselves more resilient against such attacks.
