Description
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and defection from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are seen as highly damaging to the treaty because North Korea violated it while being a member state and withdrew without huge consequences. Yet, focusing on the treaty’s institutional functions, we note that it has, in fact, done its part by screening, monitoring, and facilitating the enforcement of North Korea’s nuclear program. Moreover, it is misguided to regard the NPT as a failure for not preventing or punishing North Korea for withdrawing from the treaty or going nuclear because it is not the treaty’s purpose to act as an enforcer. Instead, by appreciating how the NPT plays its institutional role and backs enforcement, our argument suggests that the broader international community in support of nonproliferation can proactively add to existing efforts in dealing with North Korea while strengthening the treaty and regime. Specifically, by choosing to stay within and recognize the necessity of the NPT while regarding North Korea’s behaviors as an exception, member states can maintain the relevance of the NPT, which in turn allow enforcers to better restrain violators.
