Description
Since the 1970s, the United States has led an international nonproliferation effort to phase out commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two nuclear explosives ever used to make nuclear weapons. Substantial achievements include the following: converting more than 70 research reactors worldwide to use low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel that is more resistant to proliferation; designing virtually all new research reactors to use LEU fuel; and expanding the LEU requirement to medical-isotope production, US army reactors, and US space reactors. Now, however, the United States risks undermining this progress by utilizing massive amounts of weapons-grade uranium for two projects: constructing the prototype of an exotic nuclear powerplant; and supplying nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, a non-nuclear-weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This paper details the progress and challenges of HEU minimization, and then explores policy options to ensure that US initiatives to promote both nuclear energy and Asian security do not unintentionally foster the spread of nuclear weapons.
