Description
Controlling corruption is a global concern and a crucial aspect of democratisation. This study explores the impact of international organisations (IOs) on states’ control of corruption, focusing on the conditions under which IOs are most effective. While traditional literature on IO impact focuses on the importance of enforcement through conditional rewards and changing norms through socialisation, this paper introduces a new theoretical condition for impact: the desirability of ‘black knight’ actors—those who offer an alternative source of rewards and benefits to a state, that undermine IOs’ anti-corruption efforts. The existing theoretical body of work on IO impact has underestimated the significance of the then-unipolar world order, often extrapolating from immediate post-Cold War scenarios. This paper uses case studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro and argues that the existing debates should be reframed and account for multipolarity. IO impact is examined through three key outcomes: (i) policy adoption, (ii) policy implementation, and (iii) policy impact. Through the use of process tracing and the triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data, including 22 interviews and informal observations, this research examines two types of corruption: state capture, where a few individuals or interest groups dominate state processes for their benefit, and petty corruption, where public officials extract bribes from citizens. The findings suggest that without the West being the sole option, IOs’ Western-prescribed policy changes are less likely to be adopted. By theorising that black knights significantly impact IO efforts, this research reframes existing scholarly debates on IOs and introduces a new theoretical condition for their impact.
