Description
This study focuses on the political economy of aid and its impact on domestic political dynamics, shifts in power relations, order, fragility, and broader state-building efforts over the past two decades under President Hamid Karzai (2001-2014) and President Ashraf Ghani (2014-2021). Building on Alex de Waal’s ‘political marketplace’ framework, which focuses on trading political loyalty in exchange for order among state, international, and local actors, I argue that sustaining a political marketplace is crucial for maintaining order, while its disruption fuels conflict and ultimately leads to state collapse. I propose a typology categorising three main avenues—cash shipments, international lucrative contracts, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) funded projects—through which aid flows sustained the functionality of a political marketplace under Karzai. In contrast, Ghani’s disruption of the marketplace fuelled conflict and contributed to his government’s downfall. This disruption was also compounded by shifts in the positions of international actors, particularly U.S. negotiations with the Taliban, including the Doha Agreement, which accelerated state collapse. This article draws on extensive literature and first-hand data from over 100 key informant interviews conducted in Kabul in 2018, offering new insights into the political economy of aid, domestic politics, and state-building in conflict-affected settings.
