Description
States use sanctions as tools of influence in response to the deviant behavior of target or third-party states. When China is the sender, its sanctions often lack a clear resolution. However, conventional theories of sanctions, which rely largely on rationalist cost-benefit analysis, offer only partial explanations for why states impose sanctions without clear objectives, which appear empty and do not achieve economic benefits. We argue that this puzzling phenomenon can be answered from a relational approach to sanction. Rather than purely functioning as cost-balancing measures, sanctions also serve as strategic tools to manage status between the sender, who holds superior social standing, and the target. This study seeks to understand the extent to which China employs sanctions in response to provocations by Lithuania, a state with inferior status, which triggered China’s status dissatisfaction, by opening the Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius. By so doing, it bridges a gap in the literature on sanctions and status dissatisfaction. To illustrate, we conduct a case study of Chinese sanctions on Lithuania, from 2020 to 2021. Empirically, we employ mixed methods. First, we use the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) text analysis tool to analyze speeches by ministers from 2020 to 2021; the aim is to measure and operationalize indicators of status-seeking and status dissatisfaction. Second, we triangulate our findings through process tracing to test them against alternative explanations. We draw our data from a working database on China’s status-seeking, sourced from OriProbe Information Services and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.
