Description
Since the EU launched its anti-subsidy probe into made-in-China electric vehicles (EVs), Chinese manufacturers have increasingly localised their production in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to avoid potential tariffs. Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have attracted much of this investment. While this influx of Chinese capital could accelerate the EU’s green and digital transitions and enhance electromobility in the Visegrad Four (V4) states, it also raises significant concerns. Not only could it undermine the competitiveness of European carmakers, but it further deepens the EU’s dependence on China at a time when the bloc is actively pursuing its de-risking agenda.
Another concern relates to the lack of opportunity for the respective V4 states to move up the global value chains. A major argument is that Chinese EV manufacturers, with their vertically integrated supply chains, do not require significant local value addition. Yet, this has also been the case under the regional dominance of German carmakers, with the V4 states being integral to German supply chains while serving as the manufacturing hub for the European auto industry.
Putting the EU angle aside, this paper explores the relationship between the position of the V4 states in European (and indeed, global) automotive supply chains and their respective policies toward China by analysing the broader geo-economic structure that both constrains and enables the agency of CEE elites. The paper highlights the diverse interests at play within these states (including those represented by labour unions in German-owned automotive subsidiaries) rather than focusing solely on the interests of their Western European neighbours (especially those of the German carmakers). Drawing causal inferences in a critical realist manner, the analysis is framed by a historical materialist approach inspired by the works of Poulantzas and Gramsci, with a focus on core-periphery dynamics within the global automotive industry.
