Description
Amidst the horrific effects of Russian invasion, Ukraine is surprisingly advised to keep its market economy intact while planning (post)war recovery and implementing EU accession reforms. The paper explores the contradictions between the aims – aid and recovery - and means – funder input and de-regulation - of Ukraine’s financial assistance (aid and debt) and (post)war reconstruction approach encoded in the Reform Matrix, the evolution of the Ukraine Recovery Conference annual frameworks, and the sovereign debt dynamic and restructuring negotiations.
The Matrix is unprecedented in its reach and scope and consists of four structural elements - the EU Commission's Recommendations for Ukraine's EU candidate status, IMF Loan Conditions, The Ukraine Plan under the Ukraine Facility, and the World Bank Conditions (Development Policy Loan (DPL) and includes measures aimed at implementing recommendations and conditionalities necessary for assistance to continue. It contains in total 314 conditionalities and recommendations (142 of EU Enlargement, 135 Ukraine Plan, 20 IBRD DPL, and 17 IMF EFF) and 520 indicators on which dispatch of assistance depends. Content and phases of the Reforms are analysed in the paper. I explicate the continuities and contradictions in the marketisation legitimising narratives of the “collective organic intellectuals” (Gramsci) of the EU, IMF, and WB vis-à-vis Ukraine even when the state is presently the leading economic force, FDI non-existent, and within the EU the state plays an increasingly heavier role. I show that the market deregulating push amidst a war paid by debt leads to GDP erosion, uneconomic fiscal shrinkage effects, and long-term de-development.
