Description
Throughout its ten-year intervention in the Sahel, France tried to 'Europeanise' its engagement and was mostly successful, securing the long term involvement of many El member states. However, as the conflict worsened and accusations of failure multiplied, anti-French sentiment rose among Sahelian populations. While France was the driving force behind the intervention, European staff began to blame it for the failure: the accusation of 'neo-colonial behaviour' became a site of contestation for France and its allies. Drawing on 55 anonymous interviews and fieldwork in Mali during the drawdown of Operation Barkhane, this article analyses how France and its European allies understand the failure of their intervention and the rise in anti-French sentiment. I argue that the departure of France has not led to a colonial reckoning: both France and their allies take a narrow and reductive view of what neo-colonialism is. Despite being ejected from the region, French staff remain resolutely attached to their intervention doctrine in Africa and many think they will return to the Sahel in the future. Meanwhile, European staff blame French neocolonial behaviour to deflect and disavow their own colonial anxiety and the failure of the intervention. They take the ejection of France to be a license for further interventions in the Sahel led by them: without France, EU institutions and member states such as Italy and Germany continue the maintenance neo-colonial border regimes and security assistance.
