Description
The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza have severely undermined the effectiveness of international arms trade regulations. Germany plays a key role in this narrative by providing substantial arms support to both Israel and Ukraine. This highlights a tension between its declared aim to maintain a restrictive arms export policy and the actual export practices that suggest a selective compliance with international norms, leading to a deinstitutionalisation of international institutions. This paper proposes to explore the critical question: under what conditions are international institutions and norms, such as those regulating the arms trade, subject to deinstitutionalisation? Within a historical institutionalist framework, the paper traces Germany’s regulatory shifts over time, identify patterns of selective compliance and explore the underlying drivers of these choices. The paper aims to offer insights into the broader implications of selective adherence to international norms, particularly how it affects the credibility of international institutions and the stability of the arms trade regime. The research contributes to a deeper understanding of how institutional norms are upheld or undermined in times of geopolitical tension, with significant implications for global security and the future of international law.
