Description
The recent theory of 'muscular mediation' hypothesizes that coercive diplomacy can end a civil war – even if it is not 'ripe for resolution' – by proposing a compromise and then coercing the opposing sides to accept it. However, in the four cases examined to date, there is not yet a documented success where this strategy both forged peace and avoided backfiring by triggering massacres. This paper tests the theory in another case, Liberia in 2002-2003, which may be the first documented success. It finds that several third parties did successfully pressure all three armed factions in Liberia’s civil war to lay down arms and accept a compromise peace agreement that has endured, without backfiring by provoking massacres. However, it also finds that these third parties acted somewhat independently, so there was not a joint 'strategy' of muscular mediation that guided them, although the evidence does confirm the theory’s hypotheses about the conditions under which coercive diplomacy can compel an equitable peace without sparking massacres. The remaining question – whether a muscular mediator can achieve such success via an intentional strategy – calls for additional case studies.
