Description
The dynamics of interaction in South Asia particularly between India and Pakistan have been
characterized by an absence of nuclear use, along with the persistence of sub-conventional
warfare and limited conventional conflict which have been explained theoretically through the ‘stability-instability paradox’. In the India-Pakistan dyad, nuclear deterrence stability has been mired by consequential if not interminable high risks with both sides testing each other’s resolve to confirm escalation is both ‘controllable and calculable'. With the development of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan and sporadic escalatory events orchestrated by China, salami slicing territory its shared border, India’s quest for escalation dominance in South Asia based on its nuclear posture has increasingly come under fire. Given that nuclear weapons are ‘not seen as the answer to problems of conventional defense’. There exists a critical firebreak between conventional and nuclear conflict. With India’s military modernization and its strong intent to not just modernize but also integrate autonomy in preexisting systems in all theaters of conflict. Autonomous weapon systems (AWS) capable of selecting and engaging targets with greater precision and speed at reduced personnel costs in denied environments, become a suitable emerging technology to bridge the firebreak between conventional and nuclear conflict. Despite their undeniable relevance, there has been no comprehensive study of the implications of autonomous weapon systems on stability in Nuclear South Asia.The fact that these technologies can be potentially destabilizing warrants a pre-emptive study. Similar to nuclear weapons, it would be imprudent to wait until war of this kind breaks out in South Asia to think about stability dynamics. Within the broader contours of dynamics of strategic stability in South Asia, the paper will examine the stability dimensions of autonomous weapons and the risk, predictability and controllability of these weapons in South Asia.
