Description
This paper investigates China’s responses to the global contest for science and technology talent within the semiconductor industry amidst geopolitical tensions with the United States. It has two main objectives. First, it challenges the prevailing narrative that places Xi Jinping at the forefront of China’s strategy to enhance self-reliance in the sector. By examining policy documents, we argue that the Chinese Communist Party’s focus on the semiconductor industry predates Xi Jinping. Rather than initiating these efforts, Xi has accelerated and expanded them, driven largely by China’s economic conditions and the ongoing global technological revolution. Second, using the frameworks of institutional theory and human capital development, this paper analyses the interactions between educational institutions, which produce science and technology talent, and the demand for such human capital at the firm level. Based on primary data collected from key stakeholders across the semiconductor value chain, we find that the misalignment between state innovation policies and industry needs, along with the volatility and mobility of talent in various segments of the semiconductor value chain, explains why China’s efforts to develop talent for high-end chips have only been partially successful. This paper reveals institutional barriers to human capital development in high-end technology sectors.
