Description
The intensifying technological competition between the United States and China has become a defining feature of contemporary global politics, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing, where both countries employ export controls, investment restrictions, and talent policies to secure strategic advantages. Existing research often adopts a state-centric lens, overlooking the distinctive interests and strategic motivations of private semiconductor firms—such as SMIC and Huawei in China, and Intel and Qualcomm in the United States—that do not always align directly with government foreign technology policies and may subtly influence US-China technological competition. This study addresses this gap by incorporating private sector actors into the analysis, utilizing an interdisciplinary approach informed by applied economics to classify the strategic responses of semiconductor firms within divergent regulatory environments. By comparing the strategic options available to firms within the contrasting US and Chinese institutional frameworks, the research reveals the dual role of these firms as both instruments of state policy and autonomous entities pursuing self-interest. Findings underscore the complex interplay between market dynamics and national policy objectives, offering policymakers nuanced insights for managing spillover risks associated with US-China technological competition and regulating large technology firms.
