Description
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning tools are transforming life science research and biomedical applications, driving major advancements in genomics, epidemiology, biotechnology, and many other fields. These technologies are revolutionising how scientists collect and analyse data, conduct experiments, and explore complex biological systems. However, the growing reliance on AI, as part of a broader trend to ‘digitise biology’, has also warranted fears of cyber attacks that may spread diseases, cause deaths, or enable the development of biological weapons. In response, ‘cyberbiosecurity’ has emerged as a new field of research and policy analysis to study cyber-bio risks and develop ways to prevent them through pre-emptive security measures. This paper interrogates the co-production of cyberbiosecurity in two ways. First, it analyses how futuristic scenarios of cyberbio risks are primarily ‘technified’ and apolitical, i.e., granting legitimacy to specific technical epistemic communities in life sciences and computer sciences, and alienating important disciplines that study cybersecurity as a ‘technopolitical’ issue, including international relations (IR). As such, the paper highlights the significant political implications of current modes of technification and securitisation of the cyber-bio convergence, which necessitate an engagement with and from scholars in IR and security studies. Secondly, the paper investigates the implications of considering the entity of ‘life’ as a primary referent object of security on understandings of cyber threats per se. Hence, the paper asks, how adding a ‘biological’ layer to perceptions of cyber threats may influence the future of cybersecurity scholarship and governance.
