Description
Nuclear and conventional deterrence differ in theory, practice, and impact. Nuclear deterrence has worked since the end of the WWII. The differences play out in various ways depending on whether punishment or retaliation strategies constitute the basis of the deterrent threat.
This paper examines linkages between conventional deterrence and humiliation in international relations, based on IR realism theory. The study seeks to find the roots and causes of humiliation in a conflictual situation where each side pursues conventional deterrence tools for punishment. Still, they fail to stop the other side from retaliation.
The paper explores the issue further in a case study of the Israel-Iran conflict. The findings show that conventional deterrence is costly and risky for international security, pushing all sides further to retaliation strategies, acquiring the latest weapon technology, and going up an escalation ladder. Failing to conventional achieve deterrence stability may lead to total war and nuclearization of the Middle East.
