Description
This presentation explores the limits and relevance of international treaties designed to prohibit chemical and biological (CBW) programs and prevent their proliferation, using Project Coast, South Africa's CBW program from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, as a case study. Despite ratifying the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1975, South Africa developed and operated a secret CBW program, exploiting the treaty's lack of effective verification mechanisms. Similarly, after signing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993, the country concealed key details of its program. Moreover, although the CWC has led to the dismantling of Project Coast, including the privatization of the associated front companies and the destruction of numerous agents, ambiguities remain regarding the rigor of the destruction process, the retention of classified documents, and the role of the scientists involved in the program in post-apartheid society. Therefore, by examining the South African case, this presentation questions the role and limitations of the CWC and BWC in preventing state-sponsored CBW programs and their proliferation. It emphasizes the importance of learning from this case in order to establish stronger international mechanisms for accountability among States Parties and to support contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in light of contemporary CBW interests.
