Description
From the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, President Putin and others in the Russian elite used alarmist language implicitly threatening escalation to a direct war with NATO, including the use of nuclear weapons. Western leaders also feared this possibility, with President Joe Biden warning of a potential World War Three. Western critics of military support for Ukraine and of the lack of a diplomatic track warned that the West and Russia risked being trapped in an escalatory cycle that would end in a nuclear war. So far, escalation to a wider war between Russia and the West has not happened. Against this background, this paper will explore escalation dynamics in the Russia-Ukraine War. The paper will draw on existing literature on conflict escalation and crisis and intra-war behaviour. The paper will argue that, notwithstanding Russia’s unprovoked aggression and war crimes, both the West and Russia have behaved with important elements of restraint. In particular, this has included: the West’s decision not to become directly involved as a combatant; Russia’s decision not to target NATO states militarily, especially supply routes for Western military assistance to Ukraine; the non-use of nuclear weapons by Russia; and cautious responses to incidents which might have triggered escalation (such as Russia missiles falling on the territory of some NATO states). The paper will explore the possible reasons for the limited escalation of the war to date, including: the overall balance of power between the West and Russia; nuclear deterrence; the likely consequences of a conventional war between Russia and the West; the maintenance and use of channels of communication between the West and Russia. The analysis will suggest reasons for cautious optimism about the prospects for continued great power peace in the 21st century.
