Description
The application of Principal Agent Theory to civil-military relations establishes a system of delegated authority between the Principal; the civil authority, and the agent; the military. The theory holds that the military acts on the command of the civil authority to undertake missions that they have deemed in the best interests of their populations. Inherent in this system are conflicts of interest, questions of accountability and a constant struggle between the intentions of the principal and realities of how the agent must undertake their tasks.
The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have presented a challenge to the application of this theory, as these operations featured not only a principal agent relationship between the civil authorities of the various foreign actors and their respective militaries but also feature local ingenious civil authorities and their respective security forces. These local indigenous elements were often acting as agents of both the foreign principal and their agents, creating an incredibly complicated picture that leads to questions of where ultimate authority lies, how to hold individuals within this ecosystem accountable and how to create a system of ethics to govern the actions of these agents.
The purpose of this paper will be to expose the complications created by adding these additional elements to the Principal Agent relationship and to show how a lack of clarity on where authority lies, and who is responsible for the actions of those agents operating on their behalf, creates a system that struggles with the reality of modern conflicts.
