Description
When do defeated aggressors initiate revanchist wars? Existing explanations of revanchism, focusing on general considerations of retaliation and humiliation, do not answer this question adequately. However, the case of a defeated aggressor is particularly significant. Such a state not only failed to achieve its intended goals during its previous expansion but was also punished for attempting it.
I aim to demonstrate that the defeated aggressor's propensity to initiate a revanchist war, or the lack thereof, results from the degree of weakening of the defeated aggressor after the lost war. I will conceptualize three degrees of weakening and analyze the relationship between them and the likelihood of initiating a war. By ‘the lack of weakening’ of the defeated aggressor, I refer to a return to the status quo ante bellum. ‘Partial weakening’ is defined as the loss of part of the territory of the defeated aggressor or the need to reduce its military capabilities as a result of peace treaties. ‘Total weakening’ involves the dissolution or annexation of the defeated aggressor by another state, even if it can be reconstituted later.
Therefore, using case studies and process tracing, I intend to test three hypotheses:
1. The lack of weakening minimizes the likelihood of initiating a revanchist war.
2. Partial weakening increases the likelihood of initiating a revanchist war.
3. Total weakening minimizes the likelihood of initiating a revanchist war.
This research project will initiate a research program on the propensity of defeated aggressors towards revanchism.
