Description
The provision of military training and assistance by one state to the armed forces of another is a long-standing and ubiquitous feature of international relations. Existing research has highlighted the centrality of politics to the (often limited) impact of such programmes on recipient capabilities, behaviours, and preferences. Where interests align, it is argued, assistance activities can achieve dramatic transformations. When they diverge, programmes flounder as recipients resist the advice of their patrons, or else divert foreign military aid to their own particular ends. While compelling, this principal-agent account of security assistance nonetheless overlooks the myriad other aims pursued through military-to-military training relationships – beyond the improvement of local military effectiveness – by both patrons and clients alike. Often, these alternate agendas coalesce alongside more conventional training aims, or are pursued through them without being dependent upon them for success. This paper examines how different parties construct mutual value during security assistance relationships, exploring the ways in which strategic considerations, bureaucratic agendas, and local relationships interact to create diverse (and sometimes contradictory) understandings of the utility, value and meaning of military assistance.