Description
China’s economic and technological rise and greater international assertiveness during the 21st century have challenged both the United States and the European Union. The two polities have pursed different objectives in response. The US has engaged in strategic competition and, under President Trump, broad confrontation with China. The EU has sought to strike a balance between “de-risking” its economic relationship with China and cooperating where their interests overlap, e.g. climate change. This paper analyzes the extent of transatlantic policy convergence and cooperation across six policies that are central to strategic competition with China. Four address specific strategic concerns – two of these are defensive (limiting Chinese firms’ participation in 5G telecommunications networks and screening inward investment for security risks) and two are offensive (controlling exports of and screening outbound investment in advanced technologies to deny them to a (potential) adversary). The other two policies – diversifying sources of critical raw materials and semiconductors – aim to reduce vulnerability to coercion. These policies vary in terms of the extent of transatlantic convergence and of cooperation. This paper argues that this variation reflects the interaction of differences in threat perceptions and degrees of institutional capacity.
