Description
As in other fields of multilateral cooperation, India is an important and influential stakeholder in global tax governance. Its combination of economic strength, techno-diplomatic craft and coalition building have made it a crucial participant in negotiations at the OECD and G20, especially those over the taxation of digital services. Yet, for a country whose negotiators are widely respected, its positions are frequently inconsistent and hard to reconcile with its economic interest. We investigate this using interviews with policymakers in India, and those with whom they negotiated. We find that a lack of political engagement in recent years has led to negotiating positions that are closerly associated with individual, entrepreneurial bureaucrats. As individuals are moved in and out of different roles, this produces a volatility and inconsistency in policy priorities. Our focused, longitudinal case study has implications for literature on the regulatory capacity of emerging powers, since it shows how what appears in a snapshot to be an effective negotiating approach may in the long term still result in a country punching below its weight.
