Description
In recent decades, a number of populist parties have resorted to financial nationalism, using financial policies and regulations to privilege the unity, identity, and interests of natives over those of various outgroups. However, there has still been limited attention to the electoral implications of such initiatives. This paper examines how issue framing shapes voters’ support for different financial policy choices. Specifically, it relies on a conjoint survey experiment fielded on a nationally representative sample in Hungary, a crucial case for understanding the global rise of right-wing populism. Using a forced-choice experimental design, respondents were confronted with a fictive policy debate that takes place in the future, presenting different strategies regarding the presence of foreign banks in Hungary (hard financial nationalism, soft financial nationalism, or financial cosmopolitanism). In addition to the policy content, the experiment randomly varies attributes such as the political party that put the legislative proposal forward, the adopted framing strategy, the reaction of political adversaries, and the EU response. As expected, our findings indicate that a populist frame depicting foreign banks as a threat to native interests increases voters’ support for nationalist financial policies. Moreover, these effects are stronger among voters who identify with the governing party and the interest groups that are framed as beneficiaries of such measures.
