Description
Economic sovereignty, while equally critical to political sovereignty as a defining feature of statehood for newly independent nations, is far from guaranteed. In most cases, treaties formalizing independence contain provisions with intricate legal language that impose economic obligations on the new state. These include assurances over the property of foreign private capital held by former colonial nationals or firms. Furthermore, colonial-era contracts with foreign companies often remain in force after independence. Despite these assurances, expropriation and nationalization in the name of economic development were widespread during the 1960s and 70s, a period of rapid decolonization. This raises a fundamental question: Why are some newly independent states more likely to nationalize than others? Existing scholarship in international law and political science has yet to provide a comprehensive explanation for this variation.
Using comparative historical analysis and within-case process tracing of Algeria, Tunisia, Tanzania, Kenya, Indonesia, and Malaysia, this paper argues that nationalization decisions are shaped by elite-level economic ideas, offering a novel framework for understanding the economics, law, and politics of post-colonial states.
