Description
This paper investigates state resistance to the ‘chilling effect’ of international investor agreements on mining sector regulation in countries in the Global South. Scholars and activists frequently describe how international investment law disincentivises host states from increasing socio-environmental regulation while incentivising state repression of mining protest to ensure ‘full protection and security’ of mining investments. However, despite the risk of lengthy and costly legal battles, not all states acquiesce directly to the stipulations of international investment agreements. Some seek to renegotiate or intentionally breach investment agreements to enable greater domestic benefits from the sector and/or to implement stronger socio-environmental protection measures.
To understand how and why states resist the ‘chilling effect’, this paper draws on existing studies in institutional politics to compare the experiences of El Salvador, Colombia and Mexico in introducing greater socio-environmental protections in their respective mining sector. Considering the now repealed 2017 Salvadorean mining ban, the 2016 Colombian ban on mining in the páramos and the 2022 and 2023 changes to Mexican mining law, the paper points to the significance of mining to a state’s accumulation strategy, the political sources of power of the ruling elite and the dominant political discourse on foreign investment in enabling state resistance to the incentives created by international investment law.
