Description
This paper examines how the integration of military elites into political and economic spheres undermines political accountability during democratic backsliding. Moving beyond overt tactics such as electoral manipulation or court-packing, it argues that elite recruitment, that is the embedding of military figures in civilian governance and business, can gradually erode checks and balances without direct military intervention. A new theoretical framework identifies three pathways through which elite recruitment leads to weakened accountability: (1) patronage and commercialism, in which control over economic resources establishes loyalty networks that circumvent institutional oversight, (2) executive delegation, in which civilian leaders’ reliance on military elites establishes dependencies that diminish oversight, and (3) normative diffusion, in which military participation in civilian roles normalizes and validates their influence. Through comparative case studies of Indonesia and the Philip-pines, the paper analyses formal recruitment (cabinet appointments, judicial posts, and state enterprises) and informal recruitment (business networks, advisory roles, and media sym-bolism). The paper demonstrates how these processes reconfigure accountability structures and blur civilian-military boundaries. By conceptualizing elite recruitment as a subtle form of militarization, the study contributes to debates on democratic erosion and provides poli-cymakers with insights for identifying and mitigating gradual, nonviolent threats to demo-cratic governance.
