Description
Governments do not accept foreign aid uncritically. Instead, they negotiate with the aid donor, for instance, the design of internationally funded projects, and what aid can be used for. We thus increasingly know that recipient governments are important players in shaping how aid is disbursed to their country. Yet, we know little about how variation in this relationship over time influences aid outcomes. In this paper, I show how the IO-recipient government relationship is key to the implementation of IO projects. I argue that the relationship has a tension at its core: while relations of solidarity marked by a harmonious relationship between the IO and government are key for timely delivery of in-kind assistance, such as houses and food, contestation of the other’s exertion of power to make decisions on project design and implementation may be needed for governance outcomes, such as changing regulations and reforming government departments. I make this argument by drawing on 152 interviews on four hard cases: IO projects in the housing and agriculture sectors – one World Bank and one United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project in each sector – implemented in the small island developing state Dominica in the Caribbean after Hurricane Maria destroyed the island.
