Description
Geographical indications (GIs) are the most political form of intellectual property in EU trade policy. Unlike patents or trademarks, they tie value to place, tradition, and cultural heritage, making them identity-laden instruments of regulation. While the European Commission promotes GIs as protecting farmers and exporting regulatory standards, their role in trade negotiations is paradoxical. In some agreements, GIs serve as deal-makers, offering symbolic wins that facilitate domestic support and external concessions (as in CETA or Japan). In others, they become deal-breakers, provoking resistance from generic-term producers abroad and intensifying ratification struggles (as in Mercosur or Australia).
This paper asks: why do GIs smooth agreement in some cases while derailing others? Drawing on a mixed-methods design, it combines an original dataset of EU trade agreements (2000–present) with comparative case studies of Mercosur, CETA, Japan, and Australia. Quantitative models test whether the intensity and design of GI chapters affect negotiation outcomes, while process tracing and discourse analysis unpack how GIs are framed as “farmer protection,” “cultural heritage,” or “quality.”
The paper advances debates on regulatory power Europe, agri-food politics, and politicisation by reframing GIs as conditional bargaining levers. It contributes both theoretically and practically, identifying design features that mitigate deadlock risks in highly politicised trade negotiations.
