Description
This paper investigates the relationship between extended nuclear deterrence (END) and the domestic politics of client democracies. Focusing on the Netherlands, it traces how secrecy was utilized to deflect criticism of END and stabilize Dutch participation in NATO deterrence practices since the end of the Cold War. Throughout this period, the Netherlands has remained a nuclear hosting state with a strong commitment to NATO membership, yet Dutch governments have also faced periodic resistance to both nuclear policy itself and the lack of transparency around it. Such resistance has done little to alter the country’s position in NATO. This paper argues that secrecy has been instrumental in neutralizing domestic political pressures on END. First, and most obviously, secrecy shuts down debate. Dutch parliamentarians are unable to discuss the country’s policy without substantive information, and the invocation of secrecy delegitimises attempts to do so. Second, appeals to secrecy allow for selective representations of facts and rationales. In particular, references to “alliance obligations” facilitate a political useful conflation between END and NATO membership. Finally, secrecy may be used to police a distinction between insiders and outsiders to the nuclear governance system. Political uses of secrecy thus stabilize extended deterrence.
